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105) And if this is so, then it is hard to see what the alleged incompatibility 
amounts to. 
What could expressions such as "the interest of truth," "the project of deter-
mining truth," and so on, mean if they do not refer to human beings discovering 
some truth, acquiring good reasons for believing some truth, etc.? Surely what 
the decisive believer holds is that he personally has no need of further discussion 
and investigation on this topic. But he can well hold that further discussion and 
investigation is necessary for a widespread and general determination of the truth 
on this topic. Just what sorts of belief will best contribute to such discussions 
is perhaps an empirical question. But it is not implausible to suppose that such 
discussions will be most vigorous and penetrating if some of the participants 
hold their beliefs in the decisive manner. In fact, this benefit may well accrue 
even if those decisive believers are mistaken about whether they themselves are 
in epistemic need of further investigation. 
In a similar way, Gutting discounts the import of his pragmatic argument for 
this topic by simply observing that "the prudential or moral goods to be attained 
by religious belief do not require decisive assent." (p. 106) No evidence is given 
for this claim. Here again it would seem to be an empirical question as to whether 
it is decisive or interim belief which best serves the man who must steel himself 
to leap over a chasm, or to choose one path rather than another on the stormy 
mountain. Or (perhaps a more interesting case) is it decisive or interim assent 
which is best for the woman who chooses this man rather than that for her 
husband? It is, at any rate, not totally implausible to suppose that there are some 
affairs of life, maybe some affairs of religious significance, in which we would 
be better off (pragmatically, at least) with decisive rather than with interim beliefs. 
If we are not attracted by (Me), Gutting's principle of methodological conser-
vatism, we will not find in this book any support for any religious belief beyond 
minimal theism. And this, as Gutting observes, is not sufficient for a viable 
religion. Without (MC), therefore, the argument of this book leaves religion in 
desperate straits. If Gutting's arguments for (MC) persuade us, on the other 
hand, then we will be hard put not to find, in them a warrant for much more 
than Gutting allows, a decisive belief in much of the detailed doctrine of some 
religious tradition. 
Subjectivity and Religious Belief, by Stephen C. Evans. Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1982. Pp. 221. 
Reviewed by LOUIS P. POJMAN, The University of Mississippi. 
Beginning with the observation that religious belief is closely bound up with 
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the satisfaction of subjective needs and obligations, Stephen Evans tries to show 
that there are situations where such an alliance is rationally warranted. In religious 
matters it is not always reasonable to proportion the strength of one's belief to 
the amount of evidence one has for the proposition in question. Rather, one is 
often rationally justified in taking one's sUbjective needs into consideration in 
forming one's beliefs. In the main portion of the book Evans develops three 
accounts of subjective rationality: those of Kant, Kierkegaard and William James. 
The last forty pages of the work consist largely in Evan's own analysis of the 
problem in the light of these three thinkers. 
First Evans clears the ground by distinguishing two senses of 'subjective': 
that of being arbitrarily personal and that involving the interests of the subject 
in a way that is not arbitrary. Evans claims that this second sense is based on a 
proper understanding of human nature as involving the will and feelings, the 
perspective of the agent. Next Evans argues that his approach has three advantages 
over objective approaches to religious belief. His approach takes account of the 
fact that traditional natural theologies have failed to demonstrate the existence 
of God and recognizes the legitimacy of the will and feelings in becoming human 
in the full sense of that word (p. 7). Evans also makes it clear that he wants to 
steer a middle course between the dogmatists and fideists, the former unwarran-
tedly rejecting subjective justifications and the latter unwarrantedly rejecting a 
strong element of objective justification. The argument of the book is that given 
a broader notion of rationality, which includes subjective aspects, we can have 
an account of justification which includes both theoretical and subjective ele-
ments. 
The major claim is that if we recognize the limits of theoretical justification 
we shall see the legitimacy of pragmatic considerations in coming to believe 
propositions. The process goes something like this. I survey all the candidates 
that I have regarding metaphysical explanations of the universe, estimating the 
quality of evidence for each one. I find that there is insufficient evidence to 
justify belief in any of them, though some are plausible, have some evidence in 
their favor; that is, they are live options. Next I examine the way each of the 
plausible theories meets my pragmatic needs (including moral and emotional 
needs). Taking this aspect into the calculation, I decide to believe the hypothesis 
that comes out ahead in the total reckoning. Evans doesn't give us much infor-
mation on how we make this calculation. For his purpose it is enough that we 
recognize the legitimacy of taking the subjective domain into account in the 
reckoning. 
The central sections of the book treat the way in which Kant, Kierkegaard 
and James carry out the program of sUbjective justification of religious belief. 
Essentially, Kant's argument goes as follows: 
(1) Theoretical reasons can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God, 
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but they allow the proposition as possible or thinkable. 
(2) The moral law is only justified if there is a God to guarantee the correlation 
of morality with happiness. 
(3) Since we have a deep need for a justified morality and since it is at least 
thinkable that God exists, it becomes eminently reasonable to believe that God 
exists. 
Evan's treatment of Kierkegaard is refreshing to the extent that he recognizes 
that his work can be read as "giving a kind of justification of subjective 
belief'(p.76). The central argument which Evans develops at length might be 
reduced to this. Objective reflection fails us in two ways. The first way is, pace 
Kant, that it cannot settle the matter of the truth of metaphysical propositions. 
Secondly, even if it could, we would reject the proofs as antithetical to authentic 
human development which involves developing one's will and feelings in situa-
tions of deep uncertainty. Leaps of faith are needed to strengthen the volitional 
leg muscles. To be sure, Evans tries to separate the valid insight in Kierkegaard's 
account from the more extreme fideist element wherein evidence for the incarna-
tion is deemed unwelcome and unavailable. In a useful comparison between 
Kant and Kierkegaard Evans shows that Kierkegaard extends the scope of Kant's 
analysis and applies it specifically to becoming a Christian. That is, whereas the 
need satisfied by Kant's account is that of moral existence, the need satisfied 
by Kierkegaard's account is that of full human existence, including but not 
limited to the moral life. And whereas for Kant it is theism alone that is 
desideratum, for Kierkegaard it is the notion of God in time. 
The section of William James focuses on the essay "The Will to Believe." 
Evans analyses the concept of a momentous, live option which provides us with 
the datum for a cost-benefit analysis from which we may decide to believe 
religious propositions. "If religion be true, this way of life is the highest possible 
for a man, and the man who is an unbeliever cuts himself off from that way of 
life" (p. 149). Again our passional nature must be brought into the reckoning 
in deciding to believe. 
In the concluding chapters Evans analyzes the problem of subjective justifica-
tion, developing George Mavrodes' notion of the person relativeness of all 
argument and the Jamesian idea that belief is important because it is correlated 
with action. He who forbids us believe that p also forbids us to act as though p 
were true (cf. p.212). He struggles to make sense of the idea that we can both 
doubt and have religious conviction at the same time, but he doesn't tell how 
this apparent contradiction takes place (alternately?). 
While sometimes prolix, the expository sections are lucid, reliable and often 
perspicacious. One can learn much here. While Evans' own analysis ofthe issues 
often are illuminating, too many ideas are left cloudy and the arguments are not 
as clear as one might desire. Let me illustrate this by pointing to two problems 
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that I see running throughout the work and coming to a head in the final sections. 
I call them the problem of volitionalism and the problem of the belief-action 
correlation. 
Evans characterizes all three of his philosophers as volitionalists, that is, as 
thinkers who affirm our ability to obtain some beliefs by deciding to have them 
(pp. 56,87,133, 151ff, 158, 181,209). The picture presented is one in which, after 
gathering evidence for hypotheses and doing a cost-benefit calculation which 
takes into account subjective needs, one decides to and succeeds in believing 
the hypothesis in question. First of all, I doubt whether Kant would fit into this 
sort of schema, due to a rigid truth directed principle emerging from the categorical 
imperative. But more importantly, I doubt whether we can perform such leaps 
of belief, obtaining beliefs upon deciding to have them. In this regard I think 
that Evans repeats the Jamesian fallacy of equating passional or subjective con-
straints with volitional powers. No doubt our emotional biases and needs are 
causative in belief formation, but that isn't to say that we consciously choose 
beliefs. Beliefs seem to be more eventlike than actions; happenings, not volitional 
doings. Of course, Evans could take the Pascalian line and urge us to go through 
intermediate processes which would make belief acquisition more likely, but 
then he needs to discuss the ethics of these maneuvers and whether or not they 
are psychologically feasible or harmful. 
The second problem has to do with the action-belief correlation, wherein Evans 
seems to be suggesting the Jamesian thesis that belief can somehow be measured 
or inferred by actions, so that a belief that p becomes a necessary condition for 
requisite actions. That is, if I am to develop myself through certain actions I 
must believe that p obtains. If I am to live according to Christian principles, I 
must believe the central doctrines of Christianity. While I agree that normally 
there is a close connection between belief and actions, I see no necessary connec-
tion, at least not in the way Evans seems to. One need not believe that something 
is the case in order to be sufficiently motivated by fear or hope to act on the 
possibility of a propositions's being true. One may believe the suitcase in the 
comer of the room has a bomb in it which is about to explode and so quickly 
flees the room; but one may be sufficiently motivated by fear to act as if there 
were a bomb in the suitcase merely on believing that there is a 10 percent chance 
that there is one. The apparent possibility of a state of affairs obtaining is often 
sufficient to generate emotions which in tum motivate actions. This happens in 
gambling, in taking out insurance policies and in taking one's umbrella to work 
when the weather is dubious. Likewise, one could live as if Christianity were 
true on the basis of hope or fear without definitely assenting to the requisite 
propositions. 
Of course, if one has a behavioral account of belief, Evans and James' thesis 
might go through. One of the problems in Evans' book is that it looks as though 
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Kant, Kierkegaard, James and Evans have four different accounts of belief which 
are never compared or carefully analyzed (i.e., an occurrent notion, a strong 
volitional notion wherein every belief is volitionally acquired, a behavioral notion 
and Price's dispositional notion). Until we are clear on what belief is it is difficult 
to know how it relates to action. 
The Concept of God: An Exploration of Contemporary Difficulties with the 
Attributes of God, by Ronald H. Nash. Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1983. Pp. 127. 
Reviewed by CLEMENT DORE, Vanderbilt University. 
Professor Nash's book is, on the whole, a clearly written, helpful introduction 
to contemporary discussions of the nature of God. It will be of particular value 
for those who are not well acquainted with recent literature on the subject; but 
it will also be of use to those "analytic" religionists who have paid scant attention 
to process theology: Nash discusses the differences between process theologians 
and contemporary Thomists at length. 
I have some reservations about the book, three of the most substantive of 
which I will now mention. 
Nash appears to be presenting us on p. 17 with an actualist account of possible 
worlds, on which any individual in another possible world is identical with an 
individual in the actual world (though, of course, different in some respects). 
But surely, e.g., dragons exist in some possible worlds; and it looks as if it is 
in principle impossible adequately to specify individuals in the actual world who 
are identical with them. If the actualist chooses to claim that every individual 
in the actual world is a possible dragon, then the reply is that it is possible for 
there to be a larger number of dragons than there are individuals in the actual 
world. And similar considerations apply to the actualist claim that it is, e.g., 
actual reptiles (actual flame throwers, etc.) which might have been dragons. 
A more fund~mental problem is that actualism renders modal arguments for 
God's existence question-begging. If every individual which exists in a possible 
world is identical with an actual individual, then claiming that God exists in a 
possible world (or, borrowing from Plantinga, that there is a possible world in 
which maximality is exemplified) is eo ipso claiming that God exists in the actual 
world. So the possibility premiss, which is indispensable in all modal arguments 
for God's existence, would be, in those contexts, as good a candidate for being 
question-begging as any skeptic might desire, in the absence of a more extensive 
defense of it than modal arguers generally provide. 
It is, of course, true that, in order to establish that God exists in all his 
